ABOUT THE SOCIETY

Founded in 2004, the Australian National University International Relations Society is one of the ANU's largest student-run organisations, with undergraduate and postgraduate student members, non-student members, and members external to the ANU.

The Society was founded with three aims:

+ to promote the academic study of international relations and politics in the university environment;
+ facilitate the interaction of international relations students with each other in order to support each other, and enhance their learning experience; and
+ to give a social setting for those studying international relations to further the enjoyment of study and allow them to interact with future colleagues and/or employers.

For more information about the Society, the events it organises and opportunities for involvement, please visit our website at http://irsociety.weblogs.anu.edu.au/ or visit our Facebook page.

**Atlas International Relations Journal** is a publication organised by members of the Australian National University International Relations Society’s Publications and Editorial Subcommittee.

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I warmly welcome the appearance of this inaugural volume of *Atlas*, the journal of the ANU International Relations Society, and the latest ornament in the University’s growing suite of outstanding student-led research publications.

*Atlas* showcases the best in undergraduate scholarship at the ANU in International Relations, a field ever in need of emerging practitioners and theorists prepared to think creatively about global challenges. Advanced age and long experience do not necessarily guarantee quality insight and analysis, and I am delighted that students with something to say will have this opportunity to have their best work published, their voices heard, and their ideas given the respect they deserve by professional scholars and policy-makers.

The impressive essays in this volume by Elise Thomas, Akshath Kale, Kalle Kauppila, Megan Wright, Victor Ferguson and Grace Castle-Burns explore the Arab Spring and simmering tensions in Russia, the rise of China and its complex and opaque domestic politics, Australia’s alliance management, and the often overlooked but increasingly important China-India relationship. The depth of understanding and insight revealed is a tribute to the ability, hard work and commitment of the authors, and the inspiration and encouragement they have received from key faculty members in the CASS School of Politics & International Relations and the CAP School of International, Political & Strategic Studies.

My own time in government and international diplomacy has made me deeply conscious that individuals and ideas really do matter, and there is certainly no better place in Australia—and few better in the world—for both to flourish than at the ANU, not only Australia’s only genuine national university, but our finest university. Whether one is wrestling with the issues of practical policy-making, or the abstractions of International Relations theory, the study of international relations is engaging and challenging. *Atlas* is further evidence, if any were needed, that ANU has few competitors in providing that engagement and meeting that challenge.

I congratulate the ANU International Relations Society, President Adeline Clarke, and Education Director Mark Pennini for bringing *Atlas* together, and very much look forward to seeing it continue and prosper.

Kind regards,

Professor the Hon Gareth Evans AC QC  
Chancellor  
The Australian National University  
Former Minister of Australia, 1988-1996  
President Emeritus, International Crisis Group
ON behalf of the 2012 ANU International Relations Society Executive, I am excited to present to you the first volume of our journal, Atlas. The journal is a great way to exhibit some of the excellent work produced by students within our university. We are very proud to be able to provide an opportunity for students to have their work published and their hard work recognised.

The publication of a journal is something that the Society has wanted to do for some time now, and it is very exciting to see this concept come to fruition. We are grateful to Mark Pennini for his vision to create the first volume of Atlas. We thank the Publications and Editorial Subcommittee for providing their expertise to the Society on editing, formatting and standards. The Society is also grateful to the International Relations lecturers who encouraged the creation of Atlas, provided advice and recommended material from their students.

We would like to thank Professor the Hon Gareth Evans AC QC, our Patron and Chancellor of the ANU, for launching our first volume and for his kind support of the publication.

Finally, and most importantly, we would like to congratulate and thank the authors of each piece in this volume. The complex issues discussed here reflect the range of International Relations issues taught within our university, and the quality of thought of students in considering contemporary issues. The ANU International Relations Society is fortunate to be able to publish such a selection of contemporary research, covering issues so topical and thought-provoking, in Atlas.

With plans underway already for the second volume, we look forward to future volumes of Atlas. I hope to see the publication of Atlas continue and the journal grow to become an even greater reflection of the calibre of International Relations students at the ANU.

Kind regards,

Adeline Clarke
President
ANU International Relations Society
FROM THE EDITOR
MARK PENNINI
EDUCATION DIRECTOR, ANU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SOCIETY

AFTER months of hard work, it is fantastic to finally present the first volume of Atlas. It is the aim of the Society to foster the growth and reputation of Atlas so that it becomes an integral part of the ANU’s highly-regarded International Relations community.

There are many people whose support has been critical to the realisation of this project. Many of the ANU’s academics have been incredibly supportive of Atlas, and it is heartening to know so much encouragement is out there. I would especially like to thank Dr Madeline Carr for her insightful advice which has been crucial to ensuring the journal’s high standards.

I am grateful for the support of the Subcommittee and the Executive, particularly Daniel McKay, our Vice-President (Administration) and Adeline Clarke, our President. Daniel has generously offered much of his time and artistic talent to the journal. Indeed, the Society is fortunate to have someone with such a keen grasp of design on the Executive. Developing Atlas’s first volume was often difficult to balance with other commitments, but Adeline’s determination to see the project through, saintly patience, and kindness was of immeasurable help to the Subcommittee and I. Overall, she has been an exemplary President throughout.

The support of our Patron, Professor the Hon Gareth Evans AC QC is greatly valued. Indeed, Professor Evans’ support is a testament to the quality of work presented in Atlas.

Of course, I would like to thank the student authors whose essays are all fascinating, provocative pieces. These essays are among some of the best work produced at the ANU and all authors should justifiably be proud of their achievement. The opportunity to disseminate such work among the scholarly community is something to be truly treasured.

There is much planned for Atlas next year, such as inclusion of postgraduate works and approaching ANU eView. I cannot wait to see what interesting pieces will be produced and selected for inclusion in Atlas’ next volume.

Kind regards,

Mark Pennini
Education Director
ANU International Relations Society
ELISE THOMAS

Elise Thomas is an undergraduate student at the ANU studying a Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Political Science and Applied Linguistics. Elise’s essay was one of the highest graded in the course POLS2069 Politics in Russia. Shortly before the time of writing she finished an internship in the Parliament House Press Gallery. She was recently selected as the winner of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (ACT Branch)’s 2012 Undergraduate Essay Competition. Elise hopes to pursue postgraduate studies in International Relations next year.

AKSHATH KALE

Akshath Kale is a third year International Relations student at the ANU. Akshath’s essay was one of the highest graded in the course ASIA2026 The Politics of China. Originally from New Delhi, India he grew up in Sydney, Singapore and Vancouver. He has previously interned at two law firms in India and Canada. Academically, Akshath is interested in political economy, history, modern methods of warfare, nationalism and foreign policy making. He has a particular interest in Northeast Asian affairs and has aspirations of undertaking Honours.

KALLE KAUPPILA

Kalle Kauppila is a combined undergraduate Honours student at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom, and spent the past year on exchange at the ANU. Kalle’s essay was one of the highest graded in the course POLS2069 Politics in Russia. He majors in History and Political Science. Kalle is originally from Finland, having lived and attended school in St Petersburg, Russia and Dusseldorf, Germany before beginning his tertiary studies. Kalle has previously taught English at a school in Tanzania and was a contestant in the 2011 Procter & Gamble Business Challenge. Kalle wishes to pursue a career in international business, particularly in either management or political consultancy.

MEGAN WRIGHT

Megan Wright will graduate from the ANU this year with a Bachelor of Development Studies, specialising in Political Science and Indonesian. Megan’s essay was one of the highest graded in the course ASIA2026 The Politics of China. Megan is interested in the Asia-Pacific, especially development politics, tourism development, and natural hazards and disasters. Megan will embark on her third trip to Indonesia later this where she hopes to learn more about Indonesian language and culture. Following graduation, Megan hopes to pursue further study focusing on Australia’s relationship with the Asia-Pacific.
VICTOR FERGUSON

Victor Ferguson is in his third year of a combined degree in International Relations and Law at the ANU. Victor’s essay was one of the highest graded in the course POLS3001 Australian Foreign Policy: Australia’s Foreign Wars. His academic interests include strategic policy and alliance politics in the Asia-Pacific region, Sino-Australian relations, and the role nationalism plays in foreign policy. Victor is hoping to complete his Honours in International Relations at the ANU and then apply to undertake a Master of Arts at the University of Chicago.

GRACE CASTLE-BURNS

Grace Castle-Burns is a second year Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws student at the ANU. Grace’s essay was one of the highest graded in the course STST2001 International Security Issues in the Asia Pacific. After living in Thailand and Malaysia for five years, Grace developed an interest in Southeast Asian international affairs. Last summer, Grace travelled through Peru and Ecuador, completing a regional community service project. Grace intends on undertaking exchange at the University of Manchester next year. Grace hopes to pursue a career in diplomacy following her studies.
STILL THE WINTER OF DISCONTENT
WHY RUSSIA HAS NO ARAB SPRING

ELISE THOMAS

Answers to the question of what Russian anti-government protests are about are, to some extent, also answers to why they have failed to result in regime change, or in fact in any significant political upheaval. From the relatively clear demands laid down in December 2011—annulment of the 2011 and 2012 election results, the resignation of the head of the electoral commission, fair opportunities for party registration followed by new elections, and freedom for political prisoners— the purpose of the protests has faded into a confused and confusing mass of disconnected grievances, which now envelopes everything from serious corruption and miscarriages of justice, to cows protesting accession to the World Trade Organisation. The Russian protest movement has proven itself not to be in any way analogous with the Arab Spring, in terms of the flashpoint, social climate, levels of violence and repression by authorities or, perhaps most importantly, in terms of momentum and commitment from the protestors themselves. The Russian protests are far more comparable to the widely derided Occupy movement, which swept across the world in 2011. Comparisons with the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions (as the Arab Spring’s two main examples of successful regime change without considerable external aid) will be used to demonstrate the fundamental differences between the Russian protest movement and the Arab Spring uprisings.

NUREROUS articles have been written about why current protests in Russia have failed to affect change on the scale of the Arab Spring. Many of these analyses focus on factors such as the relatively small percentage of the population involved with the protest movement, its geographic concentration in Moscow and St. Petersburg, its lack of clear leadership or its heavy reliance on (predominantly Western) social media platforms, which make the movement inaccessible to the majority of the population. However, the initial protests in Tunisia and Egypt also incorporated each of these factors to greater and lesser extents. The Egyptian ‘Day of Anger’ on January 25th 2011 is estimated to have involved around 15,000 protestors in Cairo, just 0.075% of the city’s purported 20 million inhabitants. Estimates of the initial protests in Moscow on the 4th of December 2011 vary wildly, with official sources putting the number at 35,000 and unofficial sources claiming as many as 120,000, 1% of that city’s population. Cairo, and particularly Tahrir Square, formed the epicentre of the Egyptian protests, just as Moscow is the undeniable focus of the Russian protest movement. Like the Russian protests, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts lacked clear leaders and were heavily dependent on Western social media platforms, notably Twitter and Facebook, to coordinate and organise action. Analyses based solely on these factors, therefore, fail to explain why the Egyptian and Tunisian protest movements caught fire and grew into revolutions, while the Russian protests seem in danger of fizzling out.

2 ‘Russia is still far from its Arab Spring: Analysts’. Al Arabiya News. 1st February 2012; Hearst, Davd. ‘Big protests, yes, but Russians lack Arab Spring in their step’. The Sydney Morning Herald. 8th December 2011; Travin, Dmitri. ‘Is Russia’s protest movement just a flash in the pan?’. Open Democracy Russia. 4th June 2012.
4 Viney, Steven. ‘Egypt’s desert cities fail to contain growing population.’ Egypt Independent. 4th August 2011.
One difference is the spark that ignited them. The Tunisian revolution grew out of the outrage that followed the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi; the Egyptian protests trace their beginnings back to the brutal murder of Khaled Saeed by police. In both cases, the catalyst for the protests was a violent death that provoked a strong emotional reaction, and which could be blamed upon the incumbent regime. In Russia, by contrast, the protests are in response to elections which the majority of the population accepts as legitimate. Carousal voting and electoral fraud are not emotive issues on a level with the deaths of Bouazizi and Saeed — particularly not to a population as used to official corruption as the Russians — and do not provide a symbol for protestors to rally around. Most Russians accept the results of the 2011 and 2012 elections and 72% personally approve of Putin. This is in direct conflict with the central tenet of the Russian protest movement, which holds that the election results are invalid. The result is a situation in which most Russians approve of the protests themselves, on the principle that protestors have the right to express their opinions, but have little interest in joining them.

A second difference, and key to the disinterest of the broader population, is the fuel on which the protests burn. The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions occurred in a social climate of decades of extreme and often violent repression under the guise of emergency laws. Dissatisfaction, resentment and fear was widespread amongst the population, and this general feeling fuelled and sustained the uprisings. In Pew’s 2007 Global Attitudes Study, only 13% of Egyptians were happy with their government (Tunisia was not polled). A similar Pew study in 2012 found Putin and Medvedev to be broadly popular, and also found that 57% of Russians were in favour of a ‘strong hand’ over democracy. The kind of widespread, entrenched resentment towards the authorities which fed the Arab revolutions does not appear to exist in Russia. A general acceptance of the status quo is poor sustenance for a protest movement. Demographic pressures are also significant. The ‘disturbingly high’ levels of youth unemployment across the Middle East were a key contributing factor to the Arab Spring. Both countries faced (and continue to face) a ‘demographic time bomb’, with 52% of Tunisia’s and 61% of Egypt’s populations under 30. Russia is facing a demographic time bomb of its own, but in the opposite direction; the Russian population is aging. Most analysts argue that it was the youth who drove the Arab Spring; in Russia there is no similarly vast, frustrated cohort. 83% of the Russian protestors are over the age of 25, and 13% are over the age of 60. Most have higher education and

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5 Russian Public Opinion Research Centre. ‘United Russia Party: After Elections and Before Renewal’.
7 Ibid, pp.4
11 Ibid, pp.8
12 Ibid, pp.9
13 Al Tamimi, Jumama. ‘Youth employment in MENA disturbingly high – UN.’ Gulf News. 7th February 2012.
14 Madsen, Elizabeth. ‘The Demographics of Revolt.’ The Huffington Post. 15th February 2011.
16 Russian Public Opinion Research Centre. ‘Protests on Moscow’s Sakharov Prospect’. WCIOM. 27th December 2011.
are employed in the commercial sector, and almost 70% described themselves as happy, despite their political discontent.

The violently repressive reaction of authorities only served to fan the flames in Egypt and Tunisia. The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions began with violent deaths and continued in the same vein: even the earliest protests resulted in violent clashes between protestors and police, and in Egypt’s case ended with fatalities after almost every protest. By contrast the Russian protests have been generally peaceful, much to the surprise of some observers. 846 Egyptians died during the three weeks it took Mubarak to fall, and dozens have been killed since; seven months in to the Russian protests, there have been no recorded fatalities. Many people have been arrested, including prominent protestors such as Livejournal blogger and political activist Alexei Navalny, but most were released shortly after. Even some unsanctioned protests have been allowed to continue unmolested by police, although newly introduced legislation aims to render such action prohibitively expensive (fines will be increased by up to 200%). Where brutality and violent repression would have alienated the broader population, and perhaps have evoked sympathy and stoked the fires of revolt, the government’s current approach is to douse revolutionary fervour under a wave of fines, short detainments and inconveniences. Far from drawing the sympathies of the general public, as a more repressive response might have, this has led many of the public to consider protestors as more of a noisy nuisance than political freedom fighters.

The Russian protest movement may have initially been compared to the Arab Spring but, as the protestors themselves appear to recognise, a far more apt comparison is with the Occupy movement which swept across the world in 2011 (and is still clinging grimly on in some corners). The Occupy movement, which began in Wall Street and spread to more than 27 countries, was originally intended as a protest against the influence of corporate interests on democracy. As the movement broadened, however, its central message became diluted into a general, formless demand for social and economic justice. The movement has no easily identifiable demands or policies to achieve such justice, and has come under widespread criticism for its apparently directionless protests.

In May 2012 the Russian anti-government movement appropriated the name, briefly setting up an ‘Occupy Abai’ encampment around a statue of poet Abai Kunanbayev. The unsanctioned camp was tolerated for several days before being moved on by authorities. The similarities run deeper than just a name, however. Like the Occupy movement, the Russian protest movement suffers from a fundamental incoherence. Although the demands laid out in Bolotnaya Square were relatively clear, if ambitious, over time the protests’ meaning has devolved into a kind of amorphous mass of grievances without clear answers.

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22 Russian Public Opinion Research Centre. ‘Protests on Moscow’s Sakharov Prospect’. WCIOM. 27th December 2011.
24 ‘Death toll rises as protests, clashes continue across Egypt’. Xinhua News Agency. 23rd November 2011.
27 Koryolyov, Alexei. ‘Protest Law Brings Discussion Back to Duma’. Ria Novosti. 6th June 2012.
30 Fleming, Andrew. ‘Adbusters Sparks Wall Street Protest’. The Vancouver Courier. 27th September 2011.
31 ‘What’s Next for Occupy Wall Street?’ Al Jazeera. 19th March 2012.
32 ‘Third of Russians Approve of Anti-Putin Camp Closure’. Ria Novosti. 24th May 2012
This is not in itself a barrier to effective protest—the initial demands of the Tunisian and Egyptian protests could be said to have been equally unclear—but rather a symptom of the protest movement’s deeper problem: early factors, including the flashpoint, the social climate and the moderated regime response, prevented the Russian protests from gaining significant momentum, and what momentum they did have is fading away the longer protests stretch on.

The incoherence of the Egyptian and Tunisian protestors’ demands was compensated for by the sheer speed and momentum of the revolutions, and by the commitment of the protestors to achieving real change—at risk of their lives—even if the specific shape of that change came as an after-thought. The Russian protests, by comparison, have dragged out for over seven months, steadily losing momentum and allowing central demands to become diluted by more general grievances. The Russian public have had time to observe this apparent lack of direction and, as is the case with other long-running Occupy protests, are increasingly responding with annoyance and frustration. As the protests lag on, and Putin settles in to his third presidential term, the protestors themselves are losing focus and commitment to actually achieving change. The LA Times quotes a protestor: “My mother joined me at a protest rally last December, but this time she said, ‘It is all useless.’ People don’t have a real fighting spirit nowadays and they so easily lose hope.”

This is the critical weakness of the Russian protest movement, and central to its ineffectiveness: very few, including the protestors themselves, now appear to take it seriously. Numerous descriptions of the protestors’ camps (there have been several reincarnations of Occupy Abai, although none have lasted as long) describe a festival atmosphere, replete with live music and childcare. The Guardian describes ‘lectures on a wide range of topics – from peaceful resistance to weaving and sewing’ while Ria Novosti recounts a story of socialite Ksenia Sobchak (a prominent protest figure and perhaps in herself a reason why the protests are discredited by much of the population) negotiating the placement of portable toilets, and discusses the ‘true star of the protest’, a cow on a leash, brought in to ‘protest Russia’s accession to the WTO’. There are blogs dedicated to protestor fashion, and within hours of the creation of Occupy Abai, merchandise was available for order on the internet. It is an indication of the protestors’ level of commitment that many apparently went on holiday over the Christmas and New Year period – as Babich points out, ‘[r]evolutionaries don’t go on vacation’.

The successful Egyptian and Tunisian Arab Spring revolutions were fast and bloody. They began with emotive flashpoints, occurred in societies under extreme and widespread political, social, economic and demographic pressures, and were spurred by violent regime responses. The Russian protests, by comparison, have been protracted, and protestors have routinely been met with fines in addition to bullets. Russia is not a country entirely at peace, but nor is it the kind of pressure-cooker situation of pre-revolution Egypt and Tunisia. The initial flashpoint, the allegedly stolen 2011 and 2012 elections, failed to resonate with the majority population, and a quiescent social climate and a regime response based around fines and inconveniences prevented the protest movement from gaining enough momentum to compensate for its own inherent flaws. As the protests drag out those flaws are exposed, showing both a basic incoherence of demands, and lacklustre commitment from protestors. The Russian anti-government protests are fundamentally different from the protests that led to the overthrow of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes.

36 Astapkovich, Vladimir. ‘Moscow sit-in – real opposition or political circus?’ Ria Novosti. 13th May 2012.
37 Loiko, Sergei. ‘Moscow Protest Against Vladimir Putin Smaller and Quieter’. The LA Times. 11th March 2012.
38 Bennetts, Marc. ‘Russia’s Anti-Putin Protesters Bring Occupy to Moscow’. Ria Novosti. 11th May 2012.
42 Babich, Dmitry. ‘No Arab Spring in Russia’. The Telegraph. 13th April 2012.
Although protests continue, it is extremely unlikely that they will have results on anything like the scale of the Arab Spring.

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WALKING A TIGHTROPE
THE DIFFERENT INCUCTIONS OF CHINESE NATIONALISM AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY MAKING
AKSHATH KALE

China’s foreign policy can be seen in the light of the ideological shifts that have taken place in the latter half of the 20th century. However, Chinese foreign policy is not a unitary object in the international arena, and as such is a product of its own historical, cultural and ideological evolutions. Therefore, Geopolitik nationalism and its influence on Chinese foreign policy must be viewed as part of a larger corpus. This essay argues that while geopolitik nationalist discourses exist within the contemporary sphere of Chinese foreign policy making, it is firstly a view located on the fringes of Chinese nationalist inculcations and secondly it represents one of many forms of Chinese nationalism. In this regard, the word influences is used in a unitary manner which fails to appreciate the complexity in China’s contemporary foreign policy. Initially Geopolitik nationalism is put into context within the greater discipline of geopolitics, as well as into a post-Cold War Chinese context. Following this, different combinations of Chinese nationalism are examined through two case studies of the 1999 Belgrade Embassy Bombings and the 2005 Anti-Japanese protests. What is found is a Chinese leadership that fosters patriotic nationalism, when required, but also tempers it to limit any extreme discourses that might act against Beijing’s policies.

FOR the sake of clarity, this essay will use the traditional definition of realism in international relations, namely the focus on the state: ‘...its security and interests being the highest priority of political life.’ Historically, Geopolitik is derived from Bismarck’s Germany which would later influence the overtly expansionist policies of the German Empire in the lead up to the First World War and later the Third Reich. The ultimate goal is to attain lebensraum or living space for the organic nation state to survive. Organic refers to the state as beyond frontiers and focuses on the geography of ethnicity and morality. However, the current study of geopolitics and the ideal of Geopolitik are very different concepts within the same academic discourse. On the one hand geopolitics can be defined as the ‘...intellectual tradition that rests on the realist theory of international relations, and on the geography of the state.’ On the other hand Geopolitik is ‘...a normative rather than an empirical study.’ However, several pieces of Chinese literature possess tenets of Geopolitik in assessing China’s foreign standing.

Liu Mingfu and Zhang Wenmu a colonel in the PLA and an academic respectively, reflect a line of pedagogy that asserts Geopolitik tenets. Implicitly the first of these is within Liu’s China Dream which encourages Chinese leaders to pursue objectives ‘...of managing more of the earth’s resources.’ This is

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43 Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist thought in International Relations since Machiavelli, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002), 12.
46 Ibid. 603.
47 Cohen, Geography and Politics, 48.
48 Hughes, Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism, 603.
without a doubt a reference to living space for the ever growing Chinese state. Zhang furthers this idea by prescribing a ‘hard power’ position to combat the threats of liberal democracies. He points to this through the maintenance of a Sino-centric sphere of influence to ‘...keep open the Malacca Straits, to ensure access to the Indian Ocean and the resources of the Middle East...’

Liu points to ethnicity when claiming that Chinese hegemony will be built in accordance to the ‘Royal Way’ as opposed to naked aggression. This is due to his belief in: ‘...the superiority of the Yellow Race...’ Not surprisingly such writings have incited a negative reaction from critics in the west. The popular novel Wolf Totem by Lu Jiamin, which possesses ethnic elements of Geopolitik, was chastised by critics as possessing fascist traits. Popular sources aside, both Liu and Zhang target the upper leadership of the party by chastising their incoherence in Chinese foreign affairs. They view the CCP leadership’s actions as confusing the youth of China over the west’s intentions. Chinese Geopolitik has not gained any noted inertia amongst Beijing’s leadership. At the same time, beyond the label of a fringe element, Geopolitik does possess geopolitical foundations.

Military doctrine in geopolitics ‘...opens up the “space” of historical memory and the way in which it can be contested.’ Dijkink mentions that nations: ‘...have usually adopted “theories” or “geopolitical visions” that explain why a certain territory is a natural complement.’ Any loss of land to this state would be comparable to bodily harm. The engine for these interpretations was the complex notion of nationalism. Dijkink points to the malleability of nationalism as a product of political manipulation in which: ‘...an enemy is constructed or aroused...’ In this way collective identities are created. The prerequisite for this manipulation is the stability of ‘political order’ or the frame: ‘...in which values are authoritatively allocated.’ In practice this means that intra-state conflict is a sign of potentially fatal weakness, the unity of the state after all is a prerequisite for defence and or further aggrandisement. Such theoretical perceptions have led to serious concerns from the western world and the strong reaction is an indication of the residual impact Geopolitik has with other cynical assessments of China.

From the realist school of international relations Mearsheimer claims that China’s economic growth would be a potential catalyst for expansion. In an anarchic state system in which no accurate assessment of a nation’s intentions is possible, growing power will: ‘...maximise its prospects for survival...’ through the pursuit of regional hegemony. In purely realist terms this is perceived as a perpetual ‘...long-term danger to the national security and economic interests of the US...’ Regionally, Chellaney notes that while economic ties with China grow regionally, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian relations are mired by the long shadow of Chinese national assertiveness through territorial and historical disputes. The official pronouncements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs have steadily been observed to possess ‘triumphalism’ and ‘hubristic’ elements in its pronouncements, which ultimately become an anti-western stance. The example of this can be seen in the

49 Hughes, Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism, 605.
50 Ibid. 606.
52 Hughes, Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism, 610.
55 Ibid. 127.
'Beijing Consensus' which deems western neo-liberalism as unnecessary for economic growth. Not only is this viewed as a challenge to the west but also a means of spreading Chinese influence overseas. This is a complimentary discourse of extremes, in which pronouncements like Geopolitik are complimented by equally cynical foreign interpretations. Yet such assessments, both in Chinese Geopolitik and western arch-realist terms seem to lack nuance.

Shirk claims that zero-sum interpretations are based on prima facie factors and as such the details of China’s overseas policies cannot be overlooked. China as a member of ASEAN plus three, as head of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, as well as in settling long standing border disputes, asserts a positive nationalism. Chen asserts that this is one ‘...which is able to accommodate both the Chinese desires for a national rejuvenation and the general welfare of the world community.’ This is an idea that has permeated since the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of 1978, in which pragmatic economic nationalism became prominent. This translates to a rejuvenation of the state through modernisation instead of class struggle as well as the renunciation of isolationist policies. This was only further vindicated by the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. While not in a purely Geopolitik or class struggle construction, Beijing’s reaction to breaches of sovereignty together with the accompanying popular nationalism hints to occasional geopolitical evocations. However there are widely non-concordant nationalisms in China as well.

The CCP’s evocation of a ‘greater China’ concept was to foster unity domestically, with certain limits on extremes, whilst keeping up an assertive sovereignty. There is little space for a complete account of Chinese nationalism’s evolution here. Suffice it to say that since the early 20th century Chinese nationalism has predominantly been viewed in precise bifurcations between popular and centrist formulations. For the centre, the stability of the framework and by extension the nation’s unity is the focus of efforts. The popular sentiment was skewed towards ideas of an ethnocentric ‘Greater China’, the ‘East-West’ Struggle and glorified historical triumphs. The 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO counters this neat separation. These concepts came together when Renmin Ribao (RMRB), an official newspaper, published articles that reflected the popular view. The RMRB articles urged a unity amongst the greater ethnic minorities within China: ‘Indignant university students inside and out of the Great Wall are staging demonstrations to denounce the atrocity....’ On the other hand the RMRB did make several references to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests; a veiled threat to any extreme positions taken outside the CCP’s framework. In saying so, the RMRB reporting in the wake of the bombing showed that not only was the CCP using popular protests as a means of fulfilling international objectives, but it was also wary of major domestic protests.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{60} Michael D. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China”, China Leadership Monitor, No.32, 2010, 4.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. 121.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{64} Swaine, Perceptions of an Assertive China, 112.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{65} Chen Zhimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy”, Journal of Contemporary China 14:42 (February 2005), 36.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. 46.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. 67-68.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. 70. (Quotation from RMRB 10 May 1999).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. 78.}\]
can see Realpolitik nationalism with geopolitical facets, in which a set of nationalist beliefs: ‘...are built around a fundamental set of realist ideas...’\(^{73}\) While not adhering completely to Geopolitik nationalism, the rhetoric was nonetheless a geopolitical assertion of Chinese unity, in the wake of a breach of its sovereignty. However, the question of popular nationalism and Beijing’s reluctance to embrace it still stands.

Since the end of the Cold War, western observers noted the discord between ideology and the rising technocracy of the CCP. According to Barmé this national, patriotic consensus, acts, when manipulated by the party: ‘...as a crucial element in the coherence of the otherwise increasingly fragmented Chinese world.’\(^{74}\) Yet today, one can see an almost parallel nationalism. Popular nationalism forms its own set of ‘ideological frameworks’ which are at best contradictory and rarely homogeneous. Generally these bottom-up formulations challenge the centre through ‘...traditionalism, neo-conservatism, say no-ism...’\(^{75}\) the latter being derived from a popular book ‘China can say no’. The ethnic exceptionalism, found in certain expressions of popular pronouncements and actions suggests a weak link to Geopolitik.\(^{76}\) Yet, this is one of many combinations of nationalist popular sentiment and their modes of expression.

Popular nationalism can come in various different forms, most noticeably on the internet. This can be seen in the 2005 anti-Japanese protests that swept across China and South Korea over Tokyo’s glorification of Japan’s imperial past. Most popular perceptions centred on the state’s manipulation of ‘cyber-nationalism’ much as in 1999. Yet this was not the case as Chinese bloggers and political forums offered: ‘...an alternative political space for the Chinese people to express, discuss, and share their views...’\(^{77}\) Eventually commentators took the opportunity to challenge the wider official line, namely Hu Jintao’s ‘construction of a harmonious society’.\(^{78}\) However, if popular nationalism from the bottom-up challenged the CCP, did it make any tangible differences to Sino-Japanese relations? For all the synthesis of popular nationalist discourse, the impact it had on Sino-Japanese relations was minimal. In fact the popular sentiments were ‘...temporal and limited in terms of intensity...’\(^{79}\) Realpolitik nationalism as well as pragmatism necessitated the maintenance of amicable relations with Japan, a direct contradiction to the confrontational line in Geopolitik. This was demonstrated by Wen Jiabao’s visit to Japan in 2007 which specifically dealt with the issue of Sino-Japanese history.\(^{80}\)

Broadly, history is the definitive link between international relations and domestic politics.\(^{81}\) In adding another layer to China’s official nationalism, ‘National Humiliation Day’ commemorates China’s defeat in the Opium wars through films, slogans and songs.\(^{82}\) This is the framework in which the CCP can create official discourses on nationalism. Therefore, when any contentions on history arise, Beijing defends its framework as if it were sovereign territory. This was seen when Sino-Korean relations deteriorated due to Chinese

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\(^{75}\) Zhimin, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, 50.


\(^{78}\) Ibid. 146.


\(^{82}\) Ibid. 199.
revisionism which began challenging the identity of the Goguryeo Kingdom. Physical limits to cyber-nationalism are achieved through the use of internet filters and 30,000 ‘web-police’ as well as the widely proclaimed ‘great firewall’. Yet as seen with the 2005 example, the official rhetoric does not equate to state policies that determine restraint over rash actions.

An official nationalism that harbours its vision of history as identity has been created. This advocates for a China that asserts itself in the world, not through overt shows of strength, but rather through the achievements of the Chinese state and peaceful strengthening of Chinese influence abroad. As a result the western realist discourses, as well as the converse Chinese proponents of Geopolitik nationalism fail to identify that official nationalism is a product of its context as against being some form of ‘monolithic structure’, standing as an aberration to presumptions of ‘normal’ or normative Chinese international behaviour. Nevertheless Geopolitik nationalism does exist in Chinese discourses but judging by the empirical evidence, it is unlikely to gain much footing in official Chinese foreign policy making. Yet the literature does open up avenues for further examinations of the variance that exists in academic and popular expressions of nationalism when compared to official frameworks.

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BILATERAL RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUTIN’S KREMLIN
CONSISTENT PRAGMATISM, NOT ARBITRARY AGGRESSION
KALLE KAUPPILA

‘The nation which indulges towards another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave…to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.’ This sentiment from George Washington has been one shared in the last decade by the Putin-Medvedev tandem of Russian leadership, emphasizing how the ‘instability’ in its relations with the United States is ‘due in part to the tenacity of some well-known stereotypes and phobias’ and that a foreign policy approach based on a ‘balance of interests, mutually beneficial cooperation, respect and trust…is far more productive than rigid ideological dogma.’ This line of policy goes unappreciated by the West, often viewing Russia as a hostile enemy out of the dogmatically ideological, historically motivated principle Putin himself warns against; demonstrated most recently by presidential candidate Mitt Romney. Opposition to current policies exists inside Russia too, where contending accounts of Westernism and Eurasianism push towards more ideologically motivated domestic and foreign policy. The way discussion of Russian foreign policy boils down to ‘pro-western or anti-western tendency’ discourse is unproductive and deconstructive for academic discourse and the country’s bilateral relations. Russian foreign policy—considered unpredictable in Western accounts—has actually been highly consistent, resulting from an open Realpolitik and pragmatic realism suited to a changing international system. Thus, the interpretation of Moscow’s perspective on bilateral relations as realist rather than ‘hostile’ or pro- or anti-Western is far more productive discursively, but also adaptable to contemporary world affairs. Only from such an understanding can the future direction of Moscow’s approach to bilateral relations be hypothesized.

IN order to enable such conclusions to take place, however, it becomes necessary to outline the framework of Russian foreign policy in recent years as well as to briefly depict the roots of the course it has taken under Putin and Medvedev since 2000. As mentioned above, the fall of the Soviet Union led to a push in search of identity to fill the vacuum left by Soviet ideology—something which led to the ‘foreign policy debate being drawn into

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90 Ibid.
the arena of political contention within the country, where domestic and external policies are closely linked.\textsuperscript{92} Thus the 1990’s saw the debate over foreign policy reflect that over national identity - a debate in which Russians had ‘two diametrically opposed images’ of themselves, one of Westernism and one of Eurasianism.\textsuperscript{93} This context of desperate identity seeking in the 1990’s is a vital historical framework for understanding the ways in which the Kremlin’s foreign policy over the last decade has evaded ‘ideological dogma’ out of principle and instead focused on concrete interests. It is also important to note the way in which Western discourse towards the end of that decade, and even in 2000, held views of post-Soviet Russia as an ‘inward looking state’ to the extent that it had such a ‘reduced capacity’ that it would struggle to ‘confront the most significant transformation in its strategic environment in the last five centuries.’\textsuperscript{94} Perceptions also stated that Russia in 2000 was seeing ‘power and authority steadily devolving from the center to rest increasingly with regional leaders...who are not strategically oriented towards Moscow; circumstances in which ‘classic notions of Realpolitik and nation state interplay’ apparently were ‘growing less and less relevant.’\textsuperscript{95}

In the context of such conditions, it is no surprise there is still doubt over the nature or identity of not only Russia’s foreign policy, but also its political society in general. An evaluation of the last decade in foreign policy, in which objectives have been set by the Kremlin decisively and unalteringly based on national interest, should to a certain extent remove such doubt. Beginning with Putin’s first speech regarding foreign affairs in an annual address to the Federal Assembly, the emphasis has been on acting ‘in the foreign policy sphere to protect interests’ on the ‘basis of clearly defined national priorities, pragmatism, and economic effectiveness.’\textsuperscript{96} It is also stated as a ‘matter of principle’ to Russia that its ‘international partners also respect and consider our national interests’, something Putin extrapolates and specifies on as applying to ‘NATO expansion’.\textsuperscript{97} The early years of Putin’s presidency are also significant in denying any ‘habitual hatred’ or hostility towards the West, since he actually even came under criticism for performing a ‘risky westward turn’ in his support of the Bush administration’s War on Terrorism, in which Russia played ‘a key part’ and displayed ‘a noteworthy break from traditional Russian geopolitical thinking’ by accepting the ‘establishment of bases by America and its allies in Central Asia for operations against international terrorism.’\textsuperscript{98} In a 2003 TV interview Putin emphasized the way in which Russian airspace had been made available for certain flights participating in the effort against terrorism.\textsuperscript{99} This development highlights the Kremlin’s willingness to cooperate with the West in solving the ‘new security challenges’ facing the world as defined by a 2002 report from the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and show an attempt at breaking ‘some of the Cold War relics’ in which ‘both parties are viewing each other as “semi-partners” or “semi-adversaries,” an attempt which revealed today’s Russia ‘unlike the USSR’ as a state ‘not trying to impose its ideology on the rest of the world and one that is not confrontation minded.’\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{97} Vladimir Putin. "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation."
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
The period at the beginning of Putin’s rule is also important since it lays the foundation to much of the perceived ‘hostility’ of Russia towards the US and the West in the 2000’s; the above mentioned ‘gestures of rapprochement’ through aid in the War on Terror were met by the Bush Administration with ‘aggressive decisions…setting the course for global hegemony’, such as the expansion of NATO eastward and the scrapping of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which Putin declared a ‘mistake’ but also claimed to not only want to preserve, but further improve ‘present levels of bilateral relations’ in a televised address that ensued.\(^{101}\) Regardless, Lukyanov describes the US response to these gestures as having proven to Putin that ‘gentlemanly agreements with the Americans are not possible’ and as having created in the President a ‘wariness towards Washington steeped in betrayal.’\(^{102}\) Through its actions the Bush Administration also cannot be said to have offered Kremlin much of an example or model against Realpolitik, but contrarily one completely espousing it to the Russian leadership.

With those developments early in Putin’s presidency, it is not difficult to understand the ruthlessness with which the Kremlin has further fulfilled the 2001 promise to base foreign policy on national interest. The ‘colored’ revolutions and subsequent NATO sympathies in some of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) essentially culminating in the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 represented the ‘latest complications’ for Moscow, which saw the revolutions as unconstitutional coups and part of a large-scale geopolitical operation to overthrow regimes friendly to Russia.\(^{103}\) The frustration with the West’s inability to understand Russian interests is also evident from the 2007 speech at the 43\(^{rd}\) Munich Security Conference, in which Putin reiterates that ‘NATO expansion represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust’ and one ‘that cannot help but disturb us.’\(^{104}\) Medvedev, in a press conference in 2011, describes the attitude at NATO opposition to the war in Georgia as a situation in which if the West didn’t ‘want to cooperate, we won’t insist’ - only highlighting the Kremlin’s straightforward, self-first mentality in bilateral and multilateral relations.\(^{105}\)

This realist trend hardly changed during Medvedev’s term in power or even in the recent months, the beginning of Putin’s third such term. The scope and focus of the international community is now increasingly concerned with the situation in Syria, following a similar development in Libya, as opposed to that in the FSU. Interviews of Medvedev in the Financial Times in both 2008 and 2011 as well as the ‘programmatic statements’ released by Putin leading up to his third re-election all echo the sentiment of the former in 2008 that he would identify as being neither a Westernizer nor a Slavophile, since they represent labels more appropriate to the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century, not the ‘changed world’ of today in which they must base their ‘position exclusively on Russian interests’ and independent of any labels.’\(^{106}\) Both Medvedev and Putin (the latter in his speech

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warning the West not to be a ‘bull in a china shop’) base their stance on Syria on pragmatic assessment of intervention; intervention which, in Libya, entirely overstepped its intended mandate and used ‘a good resolution (res.1973) to cover up a pointless military operation,’ as result of which there still exists violence but which is no longer covered by the media.\textsuperscript{107} Hence the Kremlin is advising its diplomats at the UN to act accordingly and defy efforts for another armed intervention that would in no way serve Russian interests and, to the contrary, set a double standard that could be exploited against it in the FSU, which it still needs to control to guarantee any regional stability. This is contrary to the ideologically motivated perspective of the West that (arguably falsely in certain conditions) portrays democracy as a route to security and stability, when the examples of ‘democratic’ regime change in recent history only indicate continued violence.\textsuperscript{108} In stating (and effectively turning the tables) in February this year that ‘some aspects of the US and NATO conduct contradict the logic of modern development, relying instead on the stereotypes of a bloc-based mentality’, Putin could not have made a clearer distinction between the Kremlin’s protection of national interests and old hegemonic stereotypes.\textsuperscript{109}

The continuation of this pragmatism as Moscow’s priority in bilateral relations is not only evident from the political rhetoric of recent years outlined above, but also from concrete documents setting the tone of Russian foreign policy and military doctrine for the foreseeable future. These include the National Security Strategy until 2020, which highlights multilaterals as Russia’s foreign policy priority, with the US also falling behind the CIS and the EU in terms of importance; further emphasizing that old ‘special relationships’ do not concern the Kremlin and it will advance its interests wherever it is most effective.\textsuperscript{110} The contentions of the early ‘naughties’ against NATO expansion are also reiterated in the 2010 document on Military Doctrine, which lists the expansion ‘of the bloc’ as number one external danger to the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{111} It is significant to note that the terminology entirely echoes the sentiments of Putin and Medvedev about NATO relying on dogmatized Cold War mentalities. Also significant is the quality of response to Western (NATO) rebuttals that claim the doctrine to represent antagonizing attitudes by the Kremlin; the review by Ambassador Boris Malakhov emphasizes the wording of the doctrine in being open to cooperation with the West.\textsuperscript{112}

Consequently, it is not difficult to see that the overwhelming majority of political rhetoric and documents from the Kremlin since 2001 points to an attitude of pragmatic realism within the Russian leadership, and to those of label-casting ideological hegemonies in most academic and media discourse outside it. The nature of Russian foreign policy would be much simpler to understand if it was only right-wing, Republican Americans


\textsuperscript{109}Vladimir Putin. "Russia and the Changing World."


such as Romney (who Medvedev sees ‘no use’ in condemning, since it is just their way of ‘attaining political objectives’) interpreting or suggesting feelings of hostility.¹¹³ The issue is made much more complicated by the dominance of equally one-dimensional views in Western media (exhibited so stereotypically by Michael Weiss of The Telegraph as recently as five days before the deadline of this essay) as well as the contending ideologies in Russian political discourse itself, with Nemtsov advocating the West as ‘Russia’s natural ally’ and Dugin denouncing it as ‘a mortal threat to (her) Eurasian identity.’¹¹⁴ In midst of these contending ideologies it seems most contemporary to agree on the argument of Lukyanov ‘that the West no longer exists as a political community as Russia has come to know it’ and thus that ‘dividing a changed world into “the West and the rest” is becoming less and less meaningful.’¹¹⁵ His resulting contention, that it is then vital for Russia to maintain a ‘a free hand and demonstrate flexibility’ in order to be able to cooperate with anyone if necessary, could hardly be any more evident from the pragmatic realism that has dominated the Kremlin’s view of foreign relations since 2000.¹¹⁶ While there is no doubt that it’s realism could not be further rationalized and improved diplomatically- Nemtsov accuses Putin of unnecessary confrontationalism and needless concessions to the Chinese, while Lukyanov admits that the Kremlin ‘regrettably’ ties relations towards China and the US together, with regressions in the latter leading to greater dependence on the former- it is also clear that the choice of Russian leadership to consciously avoid ideological label and restriction has been the most effective for Russia in the contemporary world.¹¹⁷

However, from the recognition that the current state of affairs and the attitudes towards them in Russian foreign policy- both in rhetoric and reality- are based much more on pragmatic promotion of self-interest rather than on ideologically or traditionally dogmatic national hostilities, it is logical to build on its prospects for the future and hypothesize to some extent on what it has in store for us. As concluded by Karaganov and Suslov in their report The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»: Building a New Agenda. A View from Russia, even though the current state of relations is an improvement on the past, the preserving of this improvement depends largely on ‘the political positions of the Obama administration’; a dependency clear due to the realism of the Kremlin, which only cooperates if doing so complies with its national interests. Due to the resulting ‘lack of a (mutually held) strategic vision and the complete subordination to short-term political objectives’, the current situation is both highly volatile and hardly sustainable.¹¹⁸ We can only hope that this is a case of two newly cooperating, former enemies progressing step-by-step and not daring to trust each other fully in a world with renewed geopolitical boundaries and threats, to which they are only beginning to adapt; perhaps a hesitant adolescence in their relations that anyone with an interest in international peace and security must hope matures into a stable new stronghold in global power relations, and one entirely contrary to that between the two which characterized most of the previous century. Yet that is most likely to be entirely utopian, knowing not only how easily attitudes in Washington can change at the outcome of a presidential election (something certainly not an issue in Russia), but also the tendency towards dogmatic simplicity in those of the man next looking to occupy the White House in Mitt Romney. It is most likely, however, that we

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¹¹³ Dmitry Medvedev, “Financial Times Interview with President Dmitry Medvedev.” (2011)
¹¹⁵ Lukyanov, "The World Without the West."
¹¹⁶ Ibid.
¹¹⁷ Ibid.
can count on Moscow's perspective on relations to remain constant in basing its 'position exclusively on Russia's interests' and 'independent of any label that is stuck to one leader or another.' Only such a perspective, after all, frees a government from being enslaved under 'habitual hatred or habitual fondness' of particular nations.\(^{120}\)

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AN ELEPHANT OF A PUZZLE
EXPLAINING CCP LEGITIMACY IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY CHINA
MEGAN WRIGHT

‘Political parties, even communist ones, are like plants. If they do not receive sufficient nutrients and sunlight, they will ossify and die; yet if they receive such stimuli, they can continue to grow in a dynamic way’. (Shambaugh, 2008: 5). In an increasingly democratised world, scholars seem endlessly perplexed by the comparatively high level of legitimacy enjoyed by China’s Communist Party (CCP). After all, the fact that the CCP maintains political autonomy and continues to exercise authority in The People’s Republic of China (PRC) more than sixty years since its rise to power speaks a wealth of its ability to exist separate of the revolutionary support on which it has historically depended. Chinese political history is fraught with autocratic, dynastic regimes with authority of a feudal nature and, it is arguable that, the CCP has made an effort to be simultaneously reactive and proactive in its attempts to both reform and consolidate such bases of power.

IT is this simultaneity of action which best explains the comparatively high level of legitimacy still enjoyed by the CCP today, despite much scholarly argument to the contrary. Nevertheless, the contemporary political regime of China is perhaps best understood by considering the nature and capability of the CCP as a self-legitimating, self-stabilising force rather than focusing on structural flaws or limitations, as many scholars have been inclined to do (Schubert, 2008: 193). Further, as has been illustrated to be the case with authoritarian states, government legitimacy becomes identical to state legitimacy; in other words, the government is the state [and vice versa] (See Gilley, 2006; Zhu, 2011). Thus, the contemporary legitimacy of the CCP also stems from the articulation and representation of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought as collective ideology, expressed in synonymy with the government-state autology.

Despite the myriad of interpretations and definitions of legitimacy, as both theory and concept, it is imperative that, for the purposes of this essay, it be clarified in light of Chinese values and separate of Western political or cultural assumption. In other words, rather than simply acknowledging legitimacy as being state right to exercise political power (See Gilley, 2006 and 2008), it is crucial to understand the dual function of legitimacy as being ‘justification of rules in terms of shared belief, and legitimation through expressed consent’ (Saumikat, 2003: 358) and thus not solely based on political functionality. In this way, the CCP has become a self-legitimating force via three key monopolies of power which collectively form the essence of contemporary Chinese nationalism: ideological hegemony, personnel control and personal authority, and organisational control (or structure). Moreover, by responding to challenges to each of these monopolies, CCP rule has become a divine politics of sorts, articulated through its self-informing sequence of power. There is, therefore, a need to move beyond the partial scope offered by scholars whose focus remains on regime weaknesses and flaws, toward a more rounded examination of the dynamism that is the Chinese Communist Party.

There is no shortage of debate surrounding questions of the current and future legitimacy of China’s communist regime (See Schubert, 2008; Shambaugh, 2008; Zhu, 2011). Popular debates centre on questions of ideological adaptation, party and state re-structuring, increased demand for democratic and capitalist governance, and the exploitation of Chinese nationalism as a basis for cultural hegemony. However, the pertinent questions remain – how is legitimacy articulated by the CCP? And how is this legitimacy manifest in...
contemporary China? Gunter Schubert offers a significant insight into answering these questions via his analysis of David Easton’s approach to regime legitimacy (as is summarised in Table 1 (Taken from Schubert, 2008: 195)). Of this he speculates that regime legitimacy is

[the net sum of those “partial legitimacies” of moral values, institutional order and roles of authority which are generated at different spaces, as well as at different administrative layers and by different personal relationships within the Chinese political system. … Deficits in legitimacy which might occur at one point within this system can be compensated by gains in legitimacy at another point, resulting in overall regime support (and system stability). (Schubert, 2004: 198)

It is this system of coordinated “partial legitimacies”, together with compensation for deficits in (or challenges to) legitimacy, which can be observed in CCP actions and reactions over the past several decades – most prominently following the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre.

| Table 1. An Eastonian approach to legitimacy-building in non-democratic China |
|---------------|-----------------------------|
| Sources of legitimacy | “Zone of legitimacy” |
| Ideology (moral legitimacy) | Initiating ideological change and support, e.g. by: |
| | - introducing the ‘Three Represents’ and co-opting new elites |
| | - transforming the CCP into a ‘governing party’ |
| | - establishing the concept of a ‘Harmonious Society’, i.e. |
| | - setting up a new social contract |
| | - between the rich and the poor |
| | - Implementing ‘socialist rule of law’, thereby |
| | - achieving (more) legal accountability of cadres |
| | - combating cadre corruption (more) effectively |
| | - Extending political participation and strengthening democratic surveillance, e.g. by |
| | - granting more power and autonomy to the People’s Congresses |
| | - implementing direct elections at the local level (villages committees and urban neighborhood committees, village party secretaries) |
| Structure | Enhancing the quality of government, e.g. by |
| | - professionalizing cadre recruitment and management |
| | - providing better public services and administration |
| | - Promoting intra-party reform by |
| | - institutionalizing more participation and transparency for party members and the public concerning intra-party decision-making |
| Personal authority | Enhancing trust in (local) officials, e.g. by |
| | - enhancing accountability through direct and (new modes of) indirect elections |
| | - extending and improving the petition system |
| | - revising the cadre evaluation system |

Although ideological hegemony has traditionally been a foundational source of legitimacy for the CCP, at present it functions as a core “partial legitimacy”. Via the one-party system, the intrinsic nature of government-state relations and its monopoly on the implementation of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought, China’s communist regime has enjoyed near unquestioned authority to rule. However, following 1989 a crisis in legitimacy borne out of the exhaustion of revolutionary support and a drop in Marxist-Leninist
fervour\textsuperscript{121} called for a CCP response which would reaffirm their ideological legitimacy and political hegemony. According to Gilley (2008: 271) this process of self-legitimation resulted from a combination of the following factors:

1) economic growth and development;  
2) stability and governance;  
3) political and civil rights;  
4) international prestige and nationalism;  
5) cultural or historical dispositions to trust the national state; and  
6) social, cultural and economic rights.

Thus, by endorsing, among other things, the idea of \textit{yushi jujin} (adaptability and flexibility to changes in political environment) (Zhu, 2011: 128), the CCP has been successful in initiating both ideological change and support thereby maintaining legitimacy.

Among the most notable instances of \textit{yushi jujin} have been Deng Xiaoping’s model of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”\textsuperscript{122}, Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”\textsuperscript{123}, and the rejuvenation of Zhou Enlai’s “Four Modernisations”\textsuperscript{124} under Deng’s market transformations. In particular, ideological changes sought under the guidance of Deng’s leadership highlighted the historical importance of Mao, as a revered figure and representative of charisma, carefully preventing any tendency toward de-Maoisation (Robinson, 1988: 353) and reaffirming the legitimacy of the Communist Party as the founder of state. It is for this reason that Deng’s model for economic reform and opening China up to the outside world can be identified as ‘rational legitimacy’ whereby Deng rationalised foundational ideologies to implement reforms specifically characteristic of China’s needs, which aimed to restore public faith in the socialist model (Guo, 2003: 11-16).

By reflecting on the challenges faced by the People’s Republic of China in the decades since Deng’s rule, or more specifically CCP response to those challenges, ideological hegemony can be seen as the key component of reform – the means by which the party continues to rearticulate and reinvent itself to retain legitimacy. For instance, the period from 1992-1997 witnessed the introduction of a dual strategy (\textit{Zhixu de jinxin gaige} and \textit{zhengzhi wending})\textsuperscript{125} aimed at restoring people’s trust and national prosperity, but only so far as to promote the “stability of modernisation” (\textit{Xiandai wending})\textsuperscript{126} (Sausmikat, 2006: 73). More recently debate has turned to the ideological function of one-party rule, with the suggestion that the CCP is becoming a “People’s Party” aimed at benefiting the majority (Sausmikat, 2006: 82) and that the primary role of the Party is now to promote economic growth given that the time of revolutionary support has long since passed (Zhu, 2011: 126).

\textsuperscript{121}Due to the fall of the USSR and the Cold War; for more on changes to nationalism, legitimacy and economics see Downs and Saunders, 1999.

\textsuperscript{122}A process of economic reform and political authoritarianism whereby market capitalism is endorsed by liberalisation of politics is avoided (See Schoppa, 2011).

\textsuperscript{123}By this principle, the Communist Party should ‘represent the development trend of advanced productive forces, the orientation of advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority’ (Schubert, 2008: 195).

\textsuperscript{124}Involving modernisations in the areas of agriculture, industry, national defence and science, and technology – ‘carrying out the Four Modernisations requires great growth in the productive forces and ... changes in all methods of management, actions, and thinking that stand in the way of such growth’ (From “Quarterly Documentation”, 1979 in Schoppa, 2011: 367).

\textsuperscript{125}Gradual change and political stability – ‘addressing the people by propagating “gradual reforms” as defined by a strong “neo-conservative” government leading the country to prosperity and national strength; and addressing the inner-party power struggle by promoting administrative and structural reforms that supported the pragmatic and professional forces within the Party’ (Sausmikat, 2006: 73).

\textsuperscript{126}This concept was introduced after the XIVth Party Congress and aimed at preventing future economic and political mistakes whilst condemning those resulting from previous models of reform (See Sausmikat, 2006).
Perhaps the greatest threat to ideological hegemony faced by the CCP nowadays is the question of democratisation, particularly in light of China’s expanding economic markets and modernisation. This challenge embodies one that is increasingly being encountered in global politics: ‘international pressure for domestic liberalisation combined with domestic regimes that seek to resist this pressure’ (Schatz, 2006: 263). Critically, this calls for the diplomatic articulation of state ideology as a means of reaffirming popular legitimacy for the CCP not only because a shift to democracy would mean the undoing of the rationality and progress of the communist regime, but because the people of China have a right to their own system of government free of Western standards (See Sausmikat, 2003). It is for this reason, among others, that the suggestion of “democracy with Chinese characteristics” has been put forward as a means of maintaining ideological hegemony within the framework of broader liberalisms – in much the same way that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” aimed to do. Nevertheless, as He Baogang noted, “when the concept of democracy came to China it was presented as an ornament of modernity and an asset for rulers” (In Sausmikat, 2003: 378), and thus has been promoted as a means, rather than a goal, to maintaining widespread support for the communist regime.

Due to the ever-changing nature of ideological stability, the CCP have had to broaden the scope of bases for their legitimacy. As such, personnel control and personal authority is another crucial “partial legitimacy” which is, in some measure, responsible for the contemporary situation of the regime. Perhaps the most powerful means of such personnel control is the nomenklatura system, which allows the CCP to have key input into the appointment and dismissal of specific positions, as well as access to the Zhongyang Ganbu Mulu (Central Cadres List) (Shambaugh, 2008: 141; Zheng, 2010: 103). Moreover, this system, which is based on the Soviet system of the same name, stresses the pertinent authority of the communist regime in controlling the government via the management of cadre placement. Specifically, the ‘Party Management of Cadres’ system illustrates CCP effort to “assemble outstanding personnel in all areas and use them in party and state causes” (Shambaugh, 2008: 140), at the same time as implementing the ‘Cadre Exchange System’ so as to prevent cadres becoming too “localised” (Zheng, 2010: 104) – both of which are key in retaining the Party’s authoritarian role.

Although the nomenklatura system is undoubtedly crucial to CCP legitimacy, personnel control of this nature occurs at many other levels of society, with research indicating that ‘mobility under Chinese Communist rule has been shaped by state political screening and shifts in ideology’ (U, 2005: 359). Among other things, this highlights the intricacy and inter-connectedness of the CCP to all levels of society. More recently, for instance, changes in the processes of village self-governance127 have led to higher levels of CCP legitimacy and governing capacity via the political inclusion of peasants and increased levels of accountability for village cadres. For example, fieldwork conducted in Lishu County of Jilin Province found that the peasant-cadre relationship is surprisingly strong due to support from both sides for fair, transparent systems of election and governance, which resulted in a decreased turnover of village cadres between 2002-2005 – a further illustration of the consolidation of power and self-legitimating capabilities of the CCP (Schubert, 2008: 202).

This is not to say that all villages are experiencing the same level of interaction and satisfaction with the political system. In fact, expectations continue to rise due to a lack of tangible results in many poorer villages, resulting in a growing push for village cadres to perform the role of “civilising agents” by acting as a key intermediary between county government and rural villagers (Thogersen, 2003: 201-202). This appears to be the case in Xuanwei County, Yunnan Province, where village cadres perceive themselves to be of elite “quality” or “competence” (suzhi), charged with tasks such as creating social organisation, educating and delivering prosperity via economic success – believed only to be possible if the cadres themselves have the ability to

127 For more on these changes and the debates concerning village self-governance see Kelliher, 1997.
become rich first (See Thogersen, 2003). Instances such as this have tended to force a growing polarity between local rural villagers and their ruling elite, leading many in rural areas to question the source of CCP legitimacy as being elitist, rather than populist. This polarity is also reinforced in the sheer number of instances of rural unrest and protest\(^\text{128}\) estimated by Sun Liping, a Chinese academic, to be between 90 and 160 instances per day (The Economist, 2005).

Another, although by no means the final, piece of this puzzle of “partial legitimacies” is that of organisational control or structure, and its use by the CCP in enhancing government quality, control and participation. One tactical means by which such organisation has been undertaken is by careful analysis of past communist regime failures and weaknesses\(^\text{129}\), as well as examination of the internal and external challenges faced by the CCP today (Shambaugh, 2008: 2). One such internal challenge, as identified by both Zhu (2011) and Schubert (2008), is the need for expanded political participation and transparency via intra-party reform. The aim in implementing such reform is twofold; firstly, it encourages a wider public involvement in the system thereby gaining popular legitimacy for the regime; and secondly, it (theoretically) diminishes corruption (at least at local level) via increased transparency mechanisms such as professionalised systems of cadre recruitment and local election systems. Further, by establishing a more accountable, transparent government system, modernisation can be better pursued and society’s needs better met.

Another such type of intra-party reform has been the restructuring of government agencies and systems of management over the past two decades to operate in a market environment without a loss of political or economic autonomy. For instance, coal-rich provinces such as Shanxi have seen the administration of all small and medium sized coal mines transferred to state administrators, which now total more than 70% of coal output (Zhu, 2011: 131). The outcome of this, according to Zhu, is that the State Capital Management systems (guozi guanli xitong), through careful and considerable macro-management of state-owned enterprises, contribute very favourably to the Chinese economy – both domestically and internationally – in key sectors such as energy, telecommunications and transport (2011: 131). This then serves to consolidate popular legitimacy for the CCP in its ability to aid Chinese economic and global political development.

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\(^{128}\) These include any number of “mass incidents” from ‘quiet sit-ins by a handful of people to all in riots involving thousands’. However, as noted, ‘almost always, they are sparked by local grievances, rather than antipathy to the party’s rule’ (The Economist, 2005). For other such instances of rural unrest see Watts, 2006.

\(^{129}\) By posing the question ‘What lessons should the CCP learn from the implosion and demise of these other regimes that might help it avoid a similar fate?’ (Shambaugh, 2008: 2). For a detailed breakdown of such factors, as well as a comprehensive table outlining ‘Factors in the Collapse of Communist Power: China in Comparison’, see Shambaugh, 2008: ‘Chapter 8 – Staying Alive: Can the Chinese Communist Party Survive?’, Pp. 161-182.
Perhaps the most controversial and hotly debated means of organisational control for China’s Communist Party has been that of the media which has previously served as a strong basis for legitimacy, but nowadays threatens to challenge the norm. This challenge comes from the rapid growth in telecommunications which is constantly reducing public reliance on state-run media in favour of information found on the internet, thus making it increasingly difficult for the government to maintain complete control over information flows (See Guo, 2003). In fact, there are many cases of knowledge being covered up by the government and then being made public via the internet, often to the detriment of Party legitimacy – as was the case with the cover-up of the SARS outbreak in early 2003. On the other hand, the case of Chinese mafia leader Liu Yong’s execution by poison in November 2003 reinforced the role of public participation, via the internet, in instituting government transparency. Liu, who was originally sentenced to death the year before, then had his sentence suspended which aroused suspicion and widespread rumours of corruption and delusion, eventuating in an online mobilisation by means of the Chinese internet causing the second overruling to be revoked (Lagerkvist, 2005: 119). This reinforces the fact that government legitimacy itself is now becoming a more prominent issue in the organisation of CCP rule – as is evidenced by Figure 1 (Taken from Gilley, 2008: 270), which illustrates a sharp increase in the number of Party School Journals concerned with legitimacy issues between 2002 and 2006. Thus, even the Party realises that ideological hegemony and a history of strength in authority is not enough alone to face the challenges of the coming decades.

For a party which can no longer rely on revolutionary support as the basis for its comparatively high level of legitimacy, China’s Communist Party has done a remarkable job of adapting to changing ideological, political and economic challenges over the past several decades. In particular, by ensuring government-state power remains self-legitimating, the CCP has maintained a relatively tight monopoly over ideological hegemony, personnel control and personal authority, and organisational control – which, when combined, illustrate the dynamic capacity of the Communist Party to both act and react to the myriad of contemporary challenges it faces. After all, when considering the sheer size of China’s population and number of factors contributing to stable legitimacy – political or otherwise – the CCP is still more than capable of invoking overall support by means of several “partial legitimacies” – only three of which have been explored here. This proves, once and for all, that trying to comprehend any aspect of China, no matter how small, really is as the elephant was to the blind men.

For more on this, and other such issues which have been either omitted or downplayed by the Chinese media see Guo, 2003; Kahn, 2006; Lagerkvist, 2005; Wang, 2006.
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FRIVOLITY OR PRAGMATISM?
CHARACTERISING AUSTRALIAN ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT
VICTOR FERGUSON

This essay is concerned with Australia’s foreign relations and the policies guiding these relationships. In particular, it will consider the notion that the patterns of Australian alliance and enmity have been characterised by indecision, frivolity and instability. In order to determine the validity of this claim the analysis will seek to evaluate the patterns of Australia’s foreign relations through the lens of four recurring foreign policy themes: dependence on a security guarantor; ‘bandwagoning for profit’ under a global rules-based order; a need for regional security, and; the pursuit of economic interdependence. In making these evaluations it will give weight to the reasons the relationship was entered, the degree of commitment shown, the length and quality of the relationship, and its outcomes. Ultimately, it will find that Australia’s limited capacity to achieve its perceived national interests unilaterally has resulted in a series of calculated, stable foreign relations that Australia has shown continuous commitment to and experienced benefits from. Shifts in Australia’s foreign relations have been pragmatic and strategic, reflecting changes in the international system, rather than frivolity.

AUSTRALIA has a history of calculated and pragmatic foreign relations that have been defined by stability and driven by clear and recurring policy objectives. While it is evident that Australia’s relations have changed over time, this essay will seek to underline that these shifts have not been the result of indecision or frivolity. Rather, that they have been rational and precise shifts pursued in order to ensure Australia’s enduring national interests of maintaining the security of its borders and a capacity for economic development and profit. To illustrate this hypothesis it will first be suggested that, due to Australia’s inability to exercise much influence in the international system unilaterally, Australia has had limited scope for manoeuvre in its foreign policy and that this has ensured the patterns of Australian alliances and enmities have remained stable and guided by recurring policy objectives. The second section of the essay will then discuss four recurring policy themes that have influenced Australia’s foreign relations: an ‘invasion anxiety’ giving rise to a need for a security guarantor; ‘bandwagoning for profit’ under a global rules-based order; the need for regional stability, and; the pursuit of economic interdependence. It will be argued that the bipartisan continuity of these themes, and Australia’s commitment to the foreign relations they have inspired, indicates that Australia’s foreign relations have almost always been characterised by precision and stability in order to ensure minimal risk, and maximum strategic and economic benefits.

While this essay will concede that Australian foreign policy has at times been influenced by liberal internationalism, it will suggest that these notions have been secondary to Australia’s primary realpolitik foreign policy motivations of ensuring stability and security in an anarchic world. It is apparent that this traditional understanding continues to take priority when orchestrating Australia’s foreign relations. During the analysis ‘ally’ will be given a broad definition, including not only states with whom Australia is in a formal security arrangement, but also Australia’s trading partners. The analysis will also draw on Schweller’s notion of ‘bandwagoning for profit’, which suggests allying, in addition to being a defensive measure, can facilitate economic gains. In addition, this essay will adopt a Morgenthau-esque understanding of international politics and relations among states. Morgenthau describes alignments between states as constantly shifting so

as to accommodate the constant changes that occur in the international system\textsuperscript{132}. Thus, in applying this understanding it becomes apparent that states’ foreign relations will logically change over time to reflect different circumstances. Consequently, a change in relations with another state does not necessarily reflect indecision or frivolity, but is a natural occurrence in international relations. Indecision or frivolity would involve more than a shift in policy; it would require Australia to regularly and fleetingly switch allies, with little regard to the ongoing strategic benefits of the relationships. For the purposes of this essay decisiveness will be measured by the level of commitment shown to foreign relations; stability will be measured by duration and quality of relations, and; the degree of frivolity will be assessed by how well-reasoned decisions to enter alliances have been. These assessments will be made throughout the analysis of the aforementioned recurring themes in Australian foreign policy.

Historically Australia has had little scope for manoeuvre in its foreign policy decisions. This is not inferring that Australia doesn’t ‘legally’ have control over its foreign relations – this independence is inherent in Australia’s sovereignty and embedded in its Constitution\textsuperscript{133} - but rather, Australia’s options for achieving its perceived national interest have been limited by a lack of military, economic and diplomatic capabilities. Even in contemporary times, despite improvements in Australia’s capabilities, it still cannot be defined a major power – Australia sits “on the fringe [of the international system] rather than its core”\textsuperscript{134}. Consequently, Australia’s capacity to act unilaterally in the international system is limited and it has had to rely on bilateral and multilateral alliances to acquire its perceived national interests. This limited capacity to unilaterally influence global politics has been reflected in the continuity of bipartisan foreign policy objectives shared by Australia’s two major political parties, whose policies have seldom diverged even up to the present\textsuperscript{135}. It is arguable that, because Australia has lacked the capabilities to ‘go it alone’ in the international system, it has not been able to pursue frivolous or unstable relations. It has instead been required to pursue foreign relations strategically in order to attain its national interest objectives of stability, security and profit. The first recurring foreign policy theme reflecting this is the perceived need for, what Robert Menzies called, a ‘great and powerful friend’ to act as Australia’s security guarantor.

Throughout much of its history Australia’s foreign relations were underpinned by the perceived need for a ‘Great Protector’ from overseas to ensure its security. Australia’s large geographic size and small population were often deemed to cause indefensibility. When this concern was combined with Australia’s close proximity to a foreign and presumably threatening Asia, anxiety about security from invasions frequently emerged.\textsuperscript{136} Policy makers believed the easiest and least costly way to combat this assumed strategic dilemma was through dependency on a more powerful state overseas.\textsuperscript{137} Thus, Australia first relied on Britain for security until the Fall of Singapore in 1942 illustrated Britain’s waning ability to exercise military influence in Asia.\textsuperscript{138} Consequently, in the post-World War Two period, Australia sought to formally ally itself with the United States (US) through the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS, 1951) and the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO, 1954) in the hope that the US could offer Australia security from threats, and maintain stability in the Asia region\textsuperscript{139}. To demonstrate commitment to these alliances, and later as part of a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{133} Australian Commonwealth Legislature, \textit{Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900}, Chapter 1, Part V, section 51 (xxix).
\textsuperscript{134} Gary Smith, Dave Cox and Scott Burchill, \textit{Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy} (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996), 98.
\textsuperscript{136} Smith, Cox and Burchill, \textit{Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy}, 25.
\textsuperscript{137} Coral Bell, \textit{Dependant Ally: A Study in Foreign Policy} (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), 2.
\textsuperscript{138} Smith, Cox and Burchill, \textit{Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy}, 32.
\textsuperscript{139} Smith, Cox and Burchill, \textit{Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy}, 14.
\end{footnotesize}
wider defence strategy of ‘forward defence’. Australia contributed forces to military conflicts to support their security guarantor. This is seen in Australia’s support for the British in the Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the 19th century, and in both the World Wars. It is also illustrated in Australia following the US into Vietnam, the First Gulf War, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Although never a formal government policy, some commentators have suggested that another motivating factor for these deployments was an ‘insurance policy’ logic – the belief that, if Australia “paid its dues”, then its protector would be obliged to return the favour if Australia was ever attacked. Commitment has also gone beyond military assistance to broader political support. Australia’s continued commitment to these alliances indicates a high level of decisiveness in Australian policy on foreign relations.

While the benefits of Australia’s reliance on ‘great and powerful friends’ is routinely questioned, it has undoubtedly been a “central undercurrent” guiding Australian foreign policy from the 19th century until the 1970s and is of continuing relevance today. A more recent example of this policy can be seen in US President Obama’s visit to Australia in 2011, where both states emphasized their commitment to ANZUS and announced an expansion of the US military presence in northern Australia. The need for a ‘great and powerful friend’ has made Australian foreign relations profoundly stable and decisive. First, it is notable that the shift from dependence on Britain to the US was not ‘frivolous’; it was a calculated decision that reflected the gradual shift in global strategic influence occurring between the two powers. Further, far from ‘fleeting’, both of the alliances lasted in excess of 50 years and have been fundamental features of Australia’s foreign policy; as Firth highlights, no Australian government has ever seriously considered coming out from underneath the “comfort wing” of a “Great Protector” from abroad.

Another recurring trend in Australian foreign relations has been strategically pursuing foreign relations that facilitate Australia’s economic interests. Similar to the perceived constraints on Australia’s capacity to defend itself, Australia has historically been a “small and uninfluential” player in international trade. In the post-war period policy makers believed that Australia’s best opportunity to profit was through rules-based international trading regimes. Consequently, as part of broader effort towards alignment with the US, Australia successfully sought to enmesh itself in the new international political economy (IPE) and international institutions that the US was leading the creation of, and which would define the ‘new global order’. A defining feature of the new IPE was multilateral, rules-based and liberalised international trade. Australia’s commitment to this is evident in its participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and consequently the World Trade Organisation. Australia’s commitment to the US was also influenced by a belief that it could ensure stability in the Asia region, which would allow trade to flourish. This ideas appears to have been accurate as many academics have stated that the high levels of growth in East Asian trade were made possible by the multilateral trading systems led by the United States, as well as by the stability its

140 Bell, Dependant Ally: A Study in Foreign Policy, 94.
144 Smith, Cox and Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, p 25.
146 Stewart Firth, Australian International Politics: An Introduction to Foreign Policy, 2nd edition (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2005), 43.
147 Firth, Australian International Politics: An Introduction to Foreign Policy, 56.
148 Firth, Australian International Politics: An Introduction to Foreign Policy, 56.
This also helped Australia develop the extensive connections it shares with the region today.\textsuperscript{150}

These developments appear consistent with Schweller’s suggestion that bandwagoning under great powers is not merely “giving into threats”, but is a voluntary policy adopted for both security and economic gains.\textsuperscript{151} It has been suggested that the absence of perceived military threats in recent years, and as a response to a decline in prosperity, Australian policy makers’ focus has shifted to the “creation of wealth”.\textsuperscript{152} The notion that the global rules-based order, underwritten by US preeminence, is economically advantageous to Australia helps explain Australia’s continued commitment to the US alliance. Overall, it can be said that the benefits which came from bandwagoning under the US-led global rules-based order in the post-war period further illustrates that Australia’s alliance shift from Britain to the US was not frivolous, but a pragmatic and strategic decision which best accommodated Australia’s national interests. Furthermore, the continuity in Australia’s commitment to this policy is indicates stability in Australia’s foreign relations.

Australia has perceived its security and economic interest to be inextricably linked to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region, thus Australia’s foreign relations have often reflected a need for regional stability. It is generally agreed that Australia can do little to enhance global security and that it should concentrate on enhancing regional security, which is has a greater capacity to influence.\textsuperscript{153} After US President Nixon introduced the ‘Guam Doctrine’ in 1969, which involved the US reducing its military commitment to Southeast Asian allies, Australia took a more active approach towards regional security than it had previously.\textsuperscript{154} One significant part of this approach in the post-Vietnam era has been Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. Prime Minister Whitlam and consecutive governments supported Indonesia’s Soeharto regime despite its poor international reputation after its annexation of East Timor in 1975. As George suggests, Indonesia was likely supported for similar reasons that Australia had supported British imperialism and the “military adventurism” of the US; because it could maintain regional cohesion and order, and this accommodated Australia’s national interests\textsuperscript{155}. Despite a decline in relations over the East Timor problem in the late 1990s, Australia’s relations with Indonesia were largely characterised by stability and continued cooperation - the high levels of bilateral security cooperation on policing and terrorism issues in the post-9/11 period\textsuperscript{156}, as well as the 2006 Framework for Security Cooperation agreement, demonstrate the return to positive relations.

Australia has also sought to ensure regional stability on a multilateral level. This has been done through treaties with, and participation in, security forums such as SEATO during the Cold War, and more recently through the ASEAN Regional Forum\textsuperscript{157} and the East Asia Summit. Overall it can be said that Australia’s need for regional stability has seen Australia enter alliances strategically, so as to ensure the security and cohesion of its ‘neighbourhood’ that it deems necessary to ensure its national interests. Furthermore, the length and continuity of Australian contribution to its ties with Indonesia and other states are indicative of stable patterns of foreign relations.

\textsuperscript{149} See e.g Ross Garnaut, "Australia’s Asia-Pacific Journey," The Australian Quarterly 64:4 (Summer, 1992): 364.
\textsuperscript{150} Smith, Cox and Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, 85.
\textsuperscript{151} Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bring the Revisionist State Back In,” 107.
\textsuperscript{152} Smith, Cox and Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, 180.
\textsuperscript{153} Firth, Australian International Politics: An Introduction to Foreign Policy, 8.
\textsuperscript{154} George, “The Australian Search for Identity and Security,” 22.
\textsuperscript{155} George, “The Australian Search for Identity and Security,” 22.
\textsuperscript{156} Andrew MacIntyre and Douglas Ramage, Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country: Implications for Australia (Canberra: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008), 45-47.
Another recurring influence on the pattern of Australia’s foreign relations that emerged in the post-Guam period has been efforts towards becoming economically interdependent with states in the Australia’s region. This policy was influenced by the notion that economic interdependence leads to wider cooperation and provides a counterweight against military threats in the anarchical international system. Interdependence has been sought on multilateral and bilateral levels. An example of multilateral efforts can be seen in the Hawke governments conception of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989, which “paved the way” for trade liberalisation and investment among states in the Asia Pacific region. Australia has also demonstrated enthusiasm for bilateral free trade agreements and has concluded such agreements with Singapore (2003) and Thailand (2005), among other regional states. Australia also pursued high levels of trade with Japan and China, who have since become Australia’s most important trading partners. Australia’s commitment to this policy and new series of foreign relations is notably evident. As O’Neil highlights, in 2009 Australia was party to every multilateral economic institution in Asia that it had been permitted to join since the 1960s. The consistently high levels of trade flowing towards East Asia, 60% in 1996 and 54.8% in 2010, indicate stability in these economic alliances.

While the re-evaluation of foreign policy that took place during the 1970s could be seen as a period of indecision in Australia’s foreign relations – questioning whether Australia should abandon its policy of dependence on a ‘Great Protector’ to focus on regional engagement for strategic and economic stability – it is arguable that, rather being indecisive, Australia merely adopted a more independent and flexible foreign policy which continued to show commitment to old and new allies. Furthermore, Australia embracing former ‘enemies’ as economic allies is not necessarily a case of indecision; it is an example of Australia pragmatically conducting its foreign relations to reflect changes in the international system in order to accommodate its interests. For example, an expansionist Imperial Japan which conducts aerial bombardments on cities in Australia is logically considered an ‘enemy’; while a post-war Japan, disarmed and with an economy complimentary to Australia’s, makes a very practical trading ally. Overall, Australia’s efforts towards becoming economically interdependent with states in the Asia Pacific region have led to the creation of sustained, stable trading alliances that Australia has shown significant commitment to.

Viewed through the lens of these recurring policy objectives, the patterns of Australian foreign relations appear remarkably stable. This is made evident by the continuity in Australia’s commitment to alliances, the tendency for relations to be sustained over time as required, and the fact that they have arguably served Australia’s perceived interests – territorial integrity has been sustained and significant levels of economic growth have been made. On a broader level, the Australian example suggests that states who perceive themselves as unable to achieve their interests unilaterally are likely to be more calculative in their alliance formation and other foreign policy decisions. This, in turn, is likely to result in more stable and decisive patterns of foreign relations. As the 21st century unfolds and ‘power shifts’ occur it will be interesting to see how Australian policy responds. If the history of Australia’s foreign relations suggests anything, it is that Australia’s alliances are likely to change to reflect the new architecture of the international system in order to serve Australia’s enduring national interests of security and profit.

158 Smith, Cox and Burchill, *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, 16.
159 Firth, *Australian International Politics: An Introduction to Foreign Policy*, 56.
163 Smith, Cox and Burchill, *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, 85.
164 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia’s Trade With East Asia 2010*, 1.
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INDIA’S INSECURITY IN THE FACE OF RISING CHINA
POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES FOR THE SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP
GRACE CASTLE-BURNS

China and India have two of the fastest-growing populations and economies in the world, but have a long-standing geopolitical rivalry, which has significant bearing on the perceptions that they hold of each other. While India does display insecurity in the face of rising China, India’s reactions are to be expected given aggressive Chinese behaviour. This essay will firstly explore the realist notions of survival and security alongside ideas of perception and misperception. Then, it will consider the strategic, social and economic perceptions that are held. Perceptions in strategic studies can be defined as the inferences, calculations and judgements about another state, behaviour and policy. Insecurity within the same strategic context can be described as the “representation of danger as perceived by the state.” When discussing how the China-India relationship could develop in the future, a number of cooperative and bilateral options will be discussed, as framed by liberal theory. This essay will argue that trade, multilateral discussions and strategic interests have the potential to allow cooperation despite existing contention. Furthermore, emphasis will be placed on the potential for Sino-Indian relations to go beyond transactional value to grassroots cooperation. However, despite this liberal paradigm and the progress that has been made to promote interdependence and bilateralism, the Sino-Indian relationship will remain contentious in the future.

SECURITY is a primary concern within international relations, which drives actions and behaviour as states try to minimise insecurity. Insecurity is a construct that develops based on perceptions that states hold within the international sphere. Furthermore, insecurity increases as states react to their perceptions and act in a manner that threatens the security of other states. Realists argue that under such circumstances, a security dilemma can arise as each state tries to reassert power to regain a degree of security. The Sino-Indian relationship is locked in a tight security dilemma; any action that is made by one is perceived as aggressive and a threat to security for the other. Realists argue that state interaction is competitive and dominated by insecurity, which inhibits cooperation. This insecurity is evident in Chinese and Indian interaction, particularly in the Tibetan border dispute, trade imbalances, military competition and rivalry for Indian Ocean supremacy. Hostility between states can arise due to misperception at either a bilateral or multinational level. Misperception can result in inaccurate inferences, misjudgement and miscalculation of other states’ actions. Perceptions are unbalanced between India and China because Chinese perceives India as insecure and threatened while India believes that China is aggressive to maintain its dominant position which fuels Indian fears.

167 Ibid.
171 Shashank Joshi, ‘Why India is Becoming Warier of China’, Current History, 110:735, April 2011, 156.
India has expressed insecurity over China’s growing economy, which is considered a threat because India has been unable to diversify exports and successfully penetrate Chinese markets. In 2009 China benefitted from a $15.9 billion trade surplus. Furthermore, attempts were made by Chinese businesses to label Indian goods as ‘fake’, which have made it hard for Indian products to penetrate the Chinese market. China invests heavily in India’s market and has benefitted significantly from non-tariff barriers. China benefits significantly from value adding to India’s primary goods exports. Additionally, China is gradually increasing its penetration of India’s telecommunications market. Thus, while trade cooperation and volume has increased significantly between India and China, the economic flows themselves are imbalanced, which explains Indian concerns. The Sino-Indian relationship is fraught with “lopsided current account balances and neo-mercantilist overtones”. The realist notion that states pursue their own national interests and cannot rely on other states, reflects why India feels threatened by its inability to diversify and China’s increasing economic dominance.

Despite ongoing conflict and tension between China and India, increasing economic interdependence is one area that could potentially assist cooperation and stability between the two states. Trade between India and China is expected to grow to approximately $100 billion by 2015. While bilateral discussions and economic competition between the two are often criticised, growing economic interdependence withstood the shock of India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Ten days prior to Indian tests, China was identified as “potential threat number one” to India, which exemplifies the challenge that testing posed to the Sino-Indian relationship. Sino-Indian trade subsequently expanded and increased significantly, which is encouraging for their potential cooperation despite existing competition. In 2004, the top 25 exports of China and India did not overlap at all and often complemented each other. In 2009, the trade value of the Sino-Indian partnership surpassed that of the Indian-US trade partnership, making China the top trading partner of India. These positive developments with such reassuring statistics demonstrate the neo-liberal concept that states with greater economic interdependence are less likely to engage in conflict because they have more to lose, contrary to realist’s notions.

Perceptions that China and India hold of each other, and associated insecurity, are influenced significantly by the media and widespread social opinion. Furthermore, articulating insecurity through the media is not limited to India as China has raised similar concerns. Within India, it is common for the media to publish predictions as to when the Chinese will attack and it has become a matter of when, not if. Furthermore, the Indian media does not hesitate to detail Chinese duplicity along the contested border. Not surprisingly, in December 2010, the Chinese ambassador to India stated that bilateral ties were “very fragile”. This published speech demonstrates that China is insecure about how it is portrayed and perceived in the Indian media. Articulated threat perception and unverified reports can trigger hostile reactions from either side and fuel social opinion. 2006 research found 63% of Indians felt that increasing Chinese military power was a ‘bad

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174 Joshi, ‘Why India is becoming Warier of China’, 157
175 Pant, ‘China Tightens the Screws on India’, 37.
179 Ibid, 148.
182 Joshi, ‘Why India is Becoming Warier of China’, 156.
183 Ibid.
thing’. Public statistics like this demonstrate that India’s insecurity is conditioned by perceptions that China wishes to keep India psychologically and strategically handicapped. Consequently, Indian insecurity is not unfounded given the role that the media has in shaping and representing perceptions.

While Chinese and Indian perceptions are fuelled significantly by the media, social connections and cultural exchanges between the two have great potential to overcome challenges in the relationship. Exchanges on a personal level promote mutual understanding within both countries, which counters some of the negative perceptions that are fostered within society. Examples of such cultural exchange include China holding a combined development forum in 2010. In addition, 2011 was classified as the year designated to Chinese-Indian Cultural exchange. Events such as these contribute to mutual understanding amongst the citizens of both countries. Furthermore, despite Tibetan tensions, the Indian government took considerable measures to prevent Tibetan protestors disturbing the Olympic torch relay which may have embarrassed China during the torch passage through New Delhi. Two particularly important opportunities for cultural growth between India and China are the tourism and education sectors. Tourism between the two is incredibly low and very few students study in the institutions of the other country. Nonetheless, there is significant scope for expansion in these sectors, particularly because the Chinese markets for education and tourism are fairly open. While current levels of interest in the other state are low, in order to overcome public mistrust it is important that both countries make an effort to understand each other’s cultural and social features. This would benefit the Sino-Indian relationship because it would encourage positive perceptions and change at a grassroots level, promoting engagement rather than insecurity and competition. India’s fears may be mitigated by increased social exchanges because of the liberal idea that transnational ties and social communication are conductive to cooperation and the absence of war.

Contrary to liberal ideas, realist thinking emphasises that the strategic interests of a state, where survival is paramount, are the most important. Within the Sino-Indian relationship, insecurity is fuelled by perceptions of disproportionate advantages and threats to security. India has become increasingly dependent on its navy and military, enabling it to project both east and west, thereby bringing India and China into increasing conflict. China views India’s expansion across shipping lanes in China’s periphery as a significant threat. Additionally, some Chinese analysts believe that shifting alliances across the Asian region, including joint naval exercises between Australia, Japan, India and the US in 2007, fuel containment and the likelihood of democratic forces targeting China. Consequently, the Chinese government has been implementing a strategy known as the ‘string of pearls’ across the Indian Ocean. The strategy involves China establishing several ports along the Indian Ocean in friendly and allied states in order to increase Chinese influence. Beijing appears to be moving in a strategic manner to encircle India through increasing influence in Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, which has allowed for strategic alliances and partnerships; most notably the Chinese military base planned for Seychelles. The string of pearls strategy, combined with the growing maritime power that China is establishing, unnerves India and has led to fears of encirclement. Therefore, it appears that the two are engaged in a classic realist security dilemma, where each action to

186 Ibid, 263.
190 Joshi, ‘Why India is becoming Warier of China’, 158.
191 Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage’, 19.
192 Ibid.
193 Chellaney, ‘India’s Growing China Angst’, 33.
secure strategic interests and military modernisation are perceived as threats by the other. India is frustrated further by China’s tolerance of Pakistan’s belligerence, particularly Chinese silence following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and direct funding of Pakistan’s nuclear program which “lies at the heart of India’s strategic dilemma”.\textsuperscript{195} India feels threatened by China’s role as a growing strategic power because it believes China is intruding on India’s traditional strategic arena and this perception, built upon the string of pearls strategy, rationalises and feeds Indian insecurity.\textsuperscript{196}

India and China have developed collaboration by putting aside perceptions of intrusive policy in the region and increasing their strategic engagement to combat mutual challenges. Strategic cooperation in the Indian Ocean stems from common interests and threats, as reflected in the 4\textsuperscript{th} Annual Defence Dialogue between India and China, held in December 2011.\textsuperscript{197} As the trade route through which 80\% of petroleum intended for India and China passes, the Indian Ocean is strategically important to both countries.\textsuperscript{198} However, in 2008 alone, it was estimated that over 100 ships were attacked by pirates in the Indian Ocean region with about 35 vessels seized.\textsuperscript{200} A threat of this extent has the potential to unite rival countries such as India and China, because governments can justify cooperation in the face of transnational threats. The Sino-Indian relationship has benefited from undertaking joint patrols of pirate infested waters, allowing both states to overcome mutual insecurity and external threats. This illustrates that there is opportunity for liberal notions of collective security to develop, indicating that Indian insecurity is unfounded because states would agree to undertake joint responses to mutual challenges.

The motives and behaviour of each state in contested border areas have influenced each state’s perception and have remained a continual source of insecurity since the Sino-Indian 1962 War. China continues to make frequent and strident claims to territory along contested lines. This has created the perception within India that China is unwilling to maintain political understandings regarding the boundary dispute.\textsuperscript{201} The Indian foreign minister has gone on record to say that the Chinese army ‘sometimes’ intrudes into Indian Territory.\textsuperscript{202} In 2008 there were 270 line control violations by the People’s Liberation Army and 2,285 instances of “aggressive border patrolling”.\textsuperscript{203} Such border tensions are particularly common in the area of Arunachal Pradesh, which is often described as a northern Indian State, but is claimed as ‘Southern Tibet’ by the Chinese Government.\textsuperscript{204} Incursions have occurred in conjunction with extensive Chinese infrastructure building in Tibet, which allows quick mobilisation.\textsuperscript{205} Indian insecurity has been fuelled further by an essay published on a Communist Party-backed website which argued that Chinese strategy should aim to “dismember ethnic India into 20 or 30 fragments”.\textsuperscript{206} These Chinese statements are interpreted by Indians as a direct threat to their security. The border dispute was described by an Indian strategic analyst as “a loaded pistol pointed at the heart of India” due to China’s increasing expansionist policy.\textsuperscript{207} India is particularly concerned because it considers its survival and security are linked to the existence of Tibet as a buffer state.

\textsuperscript{196} Joshi, ‘Why India is becoming Warier of China’, 157.
\textsuperscript{197} Limaye, Indian-US and India-East Asian Relations, 5.
\textsuperscript{198} Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage’, 16.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid, 22.
\textsuperscript{201} Pant, ‘China Tightens the Screws on India’, 37.
\textsuperscript{202} Chellaney, ‘India’s Growing China Angst’, 32.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid 31.
\textsuperscript{205} Dutta, ‘Managing and Engaging Rising China’, 131.
\textsuperscript{206} Chellaney, ‘India’s Growing China Angst’, 33.
\textsuperscript{207} Malone, ‘India and China’, 140.
which China threatens. China’s continuing expansive territorial agenda justifies and reinforces Indian insecurity.

Despite these border tensions, China and India maintain high levels of exchange and engagement. Multilateral forums have provided China and India the opportunity to engage in discussions that benefit their bilateral relations, whilst reducing insecurity and misperception between the two states. Energy and climate change are two issues where China and India have been able to cooperate due to common positions that counter dominating Western opinions.208 Because India and China both have large populations and growing economies, they are regarded as fierce competitors for oil resources. However, they recognise that their demand for energy sources is a common interest that allows for considerable cooperation. Energy cooperation within the Sino-Indian relationship began in January 2006 when they signed a memorandum on “cooperating in securing oil and natural gas resources”.209 Since then, the two states have made several joint bids on oil fields and increased their access considerably. Similarly, India and China recognise that the need to protect their developing interests is significant and they often negotiate climate change policy as a bloc. China and India agree that as developing countries, they should have more time to “achieve comparable levels of development” before being forced to reduce emissions.210 An MOU signed before Copenhagen in 2009 made it clear that China and India would stand together in refusing to reduce emissions, while also putting pressure on rich countries who were failing to reduce carbon emissions.211 Their efforts demonstrate that despite longstanding rivalry, continued Indian insecurity may be alleviated as common interests and liberalist values enable China and India to engage in collaborative and cooperative action domestically and internationally.

India and China are entering what could be perceived as a dynamic power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. However at the same time, their growing economic interdependence and combined interests have kept them in a tight embrace. Nevertheless, the Sino-Indian relationship will continue to be hostile and problematic unless current issues of contention are addressed. Despite liberal elements of cooperation within the relationship, trade imbalances, border disputes, naval encroachment and media representation must be managed for a successful cooperative relationship to emerge. The current levels of bilateralism, increased trade, grass roots movements and transnational threat management have been enough to overcome the longstanding geo-political rivalry and security dilemma. Furthermore, the border dispute looks to become a greater issue of contention because the current status quo has not been maintained; it is likely that tensions between the two will increase. Given China’s aggressive behaviour, the border issue, gradual ‘encirclement’ of India and the trade imbalance that weighs significantly in China’s favour, it is not surprising that India feels threatened and insecure. If a positive relationship is to develop in the future, then contentious elements within the relationship need to be addressed. It would be beneficial for China and India to undertake greater liberal reforms and deeper levels of cooperation. Unlike realist approaches which feed insecurity and increase the potential for conflict and tension between India and China, liberal approaches would allow for the most successful mitigation of insecurity within the Sino-Indian relationship. Such liberal approaches would allow for peaceful development and mutual benefits within the overall relationship which would overcome existing realist geopolitical tensions.

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